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Regulation of online dispute resolution (ODR) has become an important 
element in the conceptualisation of its role as an appropriate dispute 
resolution mechanism. Given the lack of specific legislation regarding ODR 
nationally and internationally, there is a growing tendency towards seeking 
appropriate regulatory models for its regulation in the ODR literature, 
international organisations, governments and the private sector. While 
recognising the valuable contributions made in all these fields, this article 
maps the regulatory approaches for ODR adopted by governments in the 
Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce 
developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
in 1999 and the Australian Guidelines for Electronic Commerce in 2006. In 
addition, the viability of the regulatory approaches of these instruments is 
explored in the context of online consumer arbitration used for the resolution 
of cross-border business-to-consumer electronic commerce disputes. In the 
course of the discussion, some insights on further improvements to these 
guidelines are also provided.  
I INTRODUCTION 
Online dispute resolution (ODR) mechanisms which can be utilised for the 
resolution of business-to-consumer electronic commerce disputes (B2C e-
commerce disputes) are required to exist within a secure legal framework. 
Developments as to the regulation of online dispute resolution (ODR) can be 
seen mainly in three areas: in the ODR literature, in the private sector, and in the 
government sector.1 As far as the ODR-related literature is concerned, Lodder 
and Bol are of the view that ‘[n]ot only legal principles like fair trial are put into 
a novel perspective, but also new principles specifically directed at the online 
environment are needed. Therefore the drafting of legal principles for ODR is 
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1 See, eg, Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN) reflects the commitment made by the private ODR sector: 
ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (26 August 1999) 
<http://www.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/policy.htm>. 
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important’.2 Morek argues that ‘a solid legal framework is needed to allow for 
the proper growth of online dispute resolution with its norms, market and 
technology’.3 Cortes indicates that ‘the establishment of a legal framework in 
the ODR field for B2C disputes will increase legal certainty, facilitating the 
expansion of quality and fair ODR methods’.4 By examining hard law and soft 
law options for the regulation of ODR, Vilalta notes that ‘model laws and 
legislative guides, due to their particular features, may be more suitable 
instruments than conventions for the progressive harmonization of practices and 
laws in ADR/ODRs matters’.5  
Secondly, in the private ODR sector, there are providers that operate within a 
regulatory framework designed by themselves; for example, the Uniform 
Dispute Resolution Policy’s (UDRP) ICAAN Rules and supplemental rules 
adopted by UDRP providers, which are used for the resolution of domain name 
disputes.6 Another example is NetNeutrals.com, which has developed rules and 
guidelines for its ODR mechanisms.7  
Thirdly, even though there is not yet any specific legal instrument nationally or 
internationally which is particularly designed for ODR, governments have 
developed regulatory measures in the context of online consumer protection 
which can arguably be related to the regulation of ODR. Online consumer 
protection guidelines such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) Guidelines,8 the Australian Guidelines,9 national 
consumer protection laws which include the Competition and Consumer Act 
2010 (Cth) (CCA), and e-commerce-friendly laws such as the Electronic 
Transactions Act 1999 (Cth), can be cited as examples.  
2 Arno R Lodder and Stephanie H Bol, ‘Towards an Online Negotiation Environment: Legal 
Principles, Technical Requirements and the Need for Close Cooperation’ (2003) November 
ADRJ Online Monthly <http://pubs.cli.vu/pub163.php>.  
3 Rafal Morek, ‘Regulation of Online Dispute Resolution: Between Law and Technology’ (2005) 
76 <http://www.odr.info/cyberweek/Regulation%20of%20ODR_Rafal%20Morek.doc>.  
4 Pablo Cortes, ‘Accredited Online Dispute Resolution Services: Creating European Legal 
Standards for Ensuring Fair and Effective Processes’ (2008) 17(3) Information & 
Communications Technology Law 221, 224.  
5 Aura Esther Vilalta, ‘Legal Framework and Harmonization of ADR/ODR Methods’ (2010) 2(7) 
Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution 103, 106. 
6 ICANN, above n 1. 
7 NetNeutrals.com, Rules & Guidelines, <http://netneutrals.com/rulesnn.asp>. 
8 OECD, Recommendation of the OECD Council Concerning Guidelines for Consumer 
Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce (1999) (‘OECD Guidelines’) 
<http://www.oecd.org/document/50/0,3343,fr_2649_34267_1824435_1_1_1_1,00.html>. 
9 The Treasury, the Australian Guidelines for Electronic Commerce (2006) (‘Australian 
Guidelines’) 
<http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/1083/PDF/australian_guidelines_for_electronic_com
merce.pdf>. 
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From the perspective of the regulation of ODR, the question is how effectively 
ODR, including online commercial arbitration (OCA), has been secured by the 
existing regulatory frameworks, given the context of the recognition of ODR 
mechanisms as an appropriate dispute resolution mechanism for B2C 
e-commerce disputes.10 The purpose of this article is to explore governments’ 
response to the regulation of ODR, specifically the viability of the regulatory 
approaches adopted in the OECD Guidelines and Australian Guidelines in terms 
of the regulation of ODR in general and OCA in particular. This exploration is 
restricted to the OECD Guidelines and Australian Guidelines because of their 
special focus on the protection of online consumers and setting of principles that 
should be reflected in dispute resolution mechanisms for them to be appropriate 
for the resolution of B2C e-commerce disputes.  
It is here argued that the current regulatory approaches adopted in these 
instruments, which are considered nationally (Australian Guidelines) and 
internationally (OECD Guidelines) applicable benchmarks for online consumer 
protection,11 is not wholly workable (while not detrimental itself) in terms of 
regulating ODR, due to several drawbacks existing in these guidelines. Before 
moving to support this argument, there is an introduction to the relationship 
between ODR and e-commerce, followed by an outline of the scope of both sets 
of Guidelines with their objectives and legal status. The article will then briefly 
review the literature in terms of regulatory models for ODR to provide insight 
into the theoretical underpinnings of the debate over the regulation of ODR. 
Next, a detailed commentary on the viability of regulatory approaches adopted 
by the OECD Guidelines and the Australian Guidelines in light of ODR in 
general and OCA in particular is pursued. In the course of the discussion, some 
insights on further improvements to the guidelines are also provided. 
II ODR AND B2C E-COMMERCE SETTING 
Brief attention to special features that can be recognised as connecting factors 
between ODR and electronic commerce is warranted. One such factor could be 
the development of ODR as part of the broader e-commerce market. In this 
regard, it is important to identify the scope of electronic commerce. Wigand 
articulates the scope of electronic commerce in the following terms:  
10 See generally Eugene Clark and Arthur Hoyle, ‘ E-ADR: On-Line Dispute Resolution: Issues 
and Recent Developments’ (2002) 8 <http://www.canberra.edu.au/ncf/publications/e-adr.pdf>. 
11 Lisa Smith, ‘Global Online Shopping: How Well Protected is the Australian Consumer?’ (2004) 
12 Competition & Consumer Law Journal 163, 168. 
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Broadly speaking, electronic commerce includes any form of economic 
activity conducted via electronic connections. The bandwidth of ‘electronic 
commerce’ spans from electronic markets to electronic hierarchies and also 
incorporates electronically supported entrepreneurial networks and 
cooperative arrangements (electronic networks). The market coordination 
mechanism is their common characteristic. Services within the tourism, 
finance, or insurance industries, but also product distribution and customer 
services, are typical fields of application.12  
It is evident that ‘[a]n e-commerce transaction is a means of performing 
commercial activities using the global digital e-commerce infrastructure’.13 The 
Internet has created a number of vibrant e-commerce business settings, such as 
transactions that take place business to business (B2B), business to consumer 
(B2C), consumer to business (C2B) and consumer to consumer (C2C) in the 
online context.14 Importantly, the application of both the OECD Guidelines and 
Australian Guidelines is limited to the B2C e-commerce setting.15 As far as the 
B2C electronic setting is concerned, online consumers transact with online 
businesspeople ‘located far from each other’.16 One likely outcome of their 
online contracts is an increase in disputes between online businesses and online 
consumers, demanding appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms.17 Gilliéron 
also asserts that ‘[t]he growth of e-commerce is bound to be linked with online 
disputes’.18  
12 Rolf T Wigand, ‘Electronic Commerce: Definition, Theory, and Context’ (1997) 13(1) The 
Information Society: An International Journal 1, 2. 
13 Saleh Alfuraih and Richard Snow, ‘ODR and the E-commerce’ (2005) 
<http://faculty.ksu.edu.sa/ALFURAIH/csc483/Alfuraih6_ODR_and_the_E-Commerce.pdf>. 
14 DigitSmith, ecommerce definition and types of ecommerce 
<http://www.digitsmith.com/ecommerce-definition.html>. 
15 OECD Guidelines, above n 8, pt 1; Australian Guidelines, above n 9, Guideline 8. 
16 Europa, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution and Online Dispute Resolution for EU Consumers: 
Questions and Answers’ (Press Release, MEMO/11/840, 29 November 2011) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/840>; Julia Hörnle, 
‘Online Dispute Resolution –– More than the Emperor's New Clothes’ (Paper presented at 
UNECE Forum on ODR, 2003) 1 <http://www.mediate.com/Integrating/docs/Hornle(1).pdf>. 
17 See also Haitham A Haloush and Bashar H Malkawi, ‘Internet Characteristics and Online 
Alternative Dispute Resolution’ (2008) 13 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 327, 330. Carneiro 
et al argue that ‘[i]f a transaction occurs online, then disputants are likely to accept online 
techniques to resolve their disputes. Thus the development of e-commerce requires new ways of 
resolving conflicts. New ways of dispute resolution are hence appearing, so that the disputant 
parties neither need to travel nor to meet in courtrooms or in front of arbitrators or mediators’ –– 
Davide Carneiro, Paulo Novais, Francisco Andrade, John Zeleznikow, José Neves, ‘Online 
Dispute Resolution: An Artificial Intelligence Perspective’ (2012) 2 Artificial Intelligence 
Review <http://nlp.hivefire.com/articles/share/27433/>. 
18 Philippe Gilliéron, ‘From Face-To-Face to Screen-To-Screen: Real Hope or True Fallacy?’ 
(2007) 3 <http://works.bepress.com/philippe_gillieron/1/>. 
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Importantly, ODR ‘recently emerged as a set of tools and techniques, supported 
by technology, aimed at facilitating conflict resolution’.19 The rationale behind 
this novel online aspect of ODR mechanisms is that the same medium which 
has contributed to the emergence of online disputes should be used to resolve 
those disputes which emerge out of electronic commerce activities.20  
Accordingly, the technological element of ODR can also be demonstrated 
through its definitions. For example, Hörnle defines ODR as a dispute 
resolution mechanism ‘carried out by combining the information processing 
powers of computers with the networked communication facilities of the 
Internet’21 and ‘the use of online communication technology in the resolution 
process, even if the dispute itself has an offline origin’.22  
Importantly, ODR is recognised as covering a multiplicity of techniques: Lipsky 
and Avgar note that ‘ODR is not a single phenomenon but in fact an umbrella 
term for a wide array of dispute resolution procedures and technological 
tools’.23 Accordingly, online arbitration is one mechanism out of several ODR 
mechanisms.24 The definition of online arbitration entails a dispute resolution 
mechanism conducted by a third party who resolves a dispute and delivers a 
binding decision by considering the merits of the arguments of the both 
parties.25  
Importantly, it must also be noted that ODR is not limited to the resolution of 
B2C e-commerce disputes; it has broader application. At present, ODR is used 
19 Carneiro et al, above n 17.  
20 ‘It is logical to use the same medium (the Internet) for the resolution of disputes and where the 
parties are frequently located far from each other’: Hörnle, above n 16, 1. 
21 Julia Hörnle, Cross-Border Internet Dispute Resolution (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 75. 
22 Ibid 650.  
23 David B Lipsky and Ariel C Avgar, ‘Online Dispute Resolution through the Lens of Bargaining 
and Negotiation Theory: Toward an Integrated Model’ (2006) 38 University of Toledo Law 
Review 47, 48. According to Pablo Cortes, ‘the most significant ODR methods for resolving 
consumer disputes, which are automated negotiation, assisted negotiation, mediation, arbitration 
and small claims court procedures’: Pablo Cortes, ‘The Potential of Online Dispute Resolution 
as a Consumer Redress Mechanism’ (6 July 2007) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=998865>. 
24 Thomas Schultz, ‘Does Online Dispute Resolution Need Governmental Intervention? The Case 
for Architectures of Control and Trust’ (2004) 6 North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology 
71, 73 n 4. 
25 Arun Raghu, ‘The Legal Challenges facing Online Dispute resolution: An Overview’ (2007) 
9(9) Internet Law Bulletin <http://www.galexia.com/public/research/articles/research_articles-
art42.html>. 
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in diverse environments, for example ‘domain names’, ‘insurance’, ‘privacy’, 
‘family’, ‘employment’ and ‘commercial’26 and in the traditional court setting in 
the form of government-sponsored electronic courts.27 
The following section outlines the scope of the guidelines together with their 
objectives and legal status, followed by a brief literature review of the 
regulation of ODR and a detailed discussion of the viability of the regulatory 
approaches adopted in the OECD Guidelines and Australian Guidelines.  
III THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE DEVELOPMENT OF OECD 
AND AUSTRALIAN GUIDELINES 
The OECD Guidelines were promulgated by the OECD council in 1999 after 
consultation with member countries, business and consumer organisations. 
These guidelines were product of ‘the OECD Committee on Consumer Policy’ 
which ‘began to develop a set of general guidelines to protect consumers 
participating in electronic commerce without erecting barriers to trade’. The 
OECD Guidelines include many objectives. They contain a framework and a set 
of principles to assist bodies such as governments, business associations, 
consumer groups, self-regulatory bodies and individual businesses and 
consumers, with a view to providing effective consumer protection in the 
context of electronic commerce.  
One of the objectives of the OECD Guidelines is to provide a framework and 
principles for governments to use when ‘reviewing, formulating and 
implementing consumer and law enforcement policies, practices, and 
regulations’ for the purpose of providing effective online consumer protection. 
Another objective is that business associations, consumer groups and self-
regulatory bodies are provided with guidance for them to consider online 
consumer protection ‘in reviewing, formulating, and implementing self-
regulatory schemes in the context of electronic commerce’.  
Importantly, the OECD Guidelines include a set of guidelines in terms of 
jurisdiction, applicable law and dispute resolution mechanisms which have 
particular importance and relevance to the resolution of B2C e-commerce 
26 Building Trust in the Online Environment: Business to Consumer Dispute Resolution, Joint 
Conference of the OECD, Orientation Document (11-12 December 2000) 37 
<http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?doclanguage=en&cote=dsti/icc
p/reg/cp(2001)2>. 
27 Tania Sourdin and Chinthaka Liyanage, ‘The Promise and Reality of Online Dispute Resolution 
in Australia’ in Mohamed S Abdel Wahab, Ethan Katsh and Daniel Rainey (eds), Online 
Dispute Resolution: Theory and Practice a Treatise on Technology and Dispute Resolution 
(eleven International Publishing, 2012) 471–97.  
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disputes as part of the broader objective of online consumer protection. The 
latter parts of this article offer a framework for achieving these goals and 
recommended several ways to establish global co-operation with a view to 
providing effective online consumer protection. 
The first major response of the Australian government as an OECD member 
country towards developing an e-consumer protection policy framework can be 
seen in the initial policy document The Australian E-commerce Best Practice 
Model in 2000. This was repealed when the Australian Guidelines were 
introduced in 2006 in light of the OECD Guidelines, which are still current.  
In general, as far as the objectives of the Australian Guidelines are concerned 
with the regulation of ODR, the following are worth noting. The Australian 
Guidelines focus on online consumer protection and the promotion of the B2C 
e-commerce market by incorporating several principles. They include: the 
establishment of fair business practices; accessibility to the electronic delivery 
of goods and services; guidelines regarding advertising and marketing; and 
protective guidelines in regards to minors.28 Additionally, the Australian 
Guidelines encourage businesses to provide information about their business 
and contractual arrangements, which facilitates consumers’ awareness before 
any agreement between business and consumers takes place.  
In line with these objectives, the Guidelines are available in terms of ‘the law 
and forum for the resolution of contractual disputes’ and ‘the establishment of 
fair and effective procedures for handling complaints and resolving disputes’. It 
is clear that the Australian government’s policy approaches towards the 
regulation of appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms for B2C e-commerce 
disputes are reflected in the Australian Guidelines.  
In common, both instruments provide a set of guidelines which lack binding 
force. The OECD states that ‘[t]hese guidelines represent a recommendation to 
governments, businesses, consumers, and their representatives’. A similar 
position in terms of its impact on ‘existing laws and regulation’ is reflected in 
the Australian Guidelines, as in the following:  
11.  The Guidelines are not a replacement for consumer protection laws or 
codes of conduct. Complying with the Guidelines does not exempt a business 
from compliance with obligations under such laws or codes. 
28 Australian Guidelines, above n 9, Guideline 10. 
 
 
                                                 
258 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 17 NO 2 
 
12.  Every effort has been made to avoid inconsistencies with existing laws. 
However, if there is an inconsistency, the law has precedence over the 
Guidelines. 
13.  Some parts of the Guidelines reflect legal requirements. Businesses should 
not rely on the Guidelines as a definitive statement of these requirements. 
Also, not all legal requirements relevant to electronic commerce are reflected 
in the Guidelines. 
Basically, the rationale behind the development of these guidelines is to protect 
online consumers in transactions with online businesses over the internet. Under 
this rationale, it can be argued that there are standards embedded in both of 
these OECD Guidelines and the Australian Guidelines reflecting the 
commitment of the OECD and Australian government towards bringing 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and ODR into a recognised legal 
framework to ensure online consumer protection, especially those who 
encounter disputes in the B2C cross-border context. As such, it is worthwhile 
identifying the regulatory models and their scope enshrined in the OECD 
Guidelines and the Australian Guidelines, as part of the debate over the 
regulation of ODR in the ODR-related literature.  
IV DEBATE IN ODR LITERATURE 
Whether ODR should be regulated is an ongoing debate in the ODR literature. 
Some writers note that there are philosophical differences between countries. 
For example, by referring to the European Union (EU), North America and 
Australia, Clark and Hoyle indicate that ‘Europeans generally are not trusting of 
private regulation. They are accustomed to more government intervention to get 
these matters right’.29 This assertion can arguably be further supported by an 
example. The recently proposed ‘[p]roposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on online dispute resolution for consumer 
disputes’ in 201130 under which ‘EU countries will be free to create their 
national rules to make the participation of traders in ADR procedures mandatory 
or their outcome binding on traders’.31 As far as the United States and Australia 
29 Clark and Hoyle, above n 10, 5.  
30 Regulation (EC) 2011/0374 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Online Dispute 
Resolution for Consumer Disputes [2011] OJ.  
31 Europa Press Release, above n 16: ‘The European Parliament and the Council have already 
expressed their commitment to adopting the legislative package on ADR and ODR by the end of 
2012, as part of coordinated efforts to re-launch the Single Market.’  
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are concerned, ‘there is much more faith in and reliance on industry to lead the 
way and govern itself’.32  
The Arbitration Fairness Act 2011 (US) which is designed to remove unfair 
aspects of binding arbitration exists still in the form of a bill and the liberal 
approach adopted by the judiciary in regard to mandatory OCA clauses from the 
American perspective can be cited as examples for the support of the United 
States approach.33 These two authors view in terms of Australian government’s 
regulatory approach can be justified with the examples such as the development 
of standards which non-binding in nature for the regulation of ODR in the 
broader context of ADR taking into consideration offline and online context, eg, 
standards developed by the National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory 
Council (NADRAC) for ADR mechanisms34 and online consumer protection 
standards embedded in the Australian Guidelines. In fact, as far as the 
Australian approach to the regulation of ODR is concerned in light of the recent 
legislative developments which can be applied to the regulation of ODR, it can 
be argued that Australian regulatory approach seems to favour more government 
involvement. For example, unfair contract terms-related statutory framework 
embedded in the Australian CCA can be applied to the enforceability of ODR 
clauses.  
Importantly, many scholars advocate diverse regulatory approaches which could 
be applicable to ODR because of the absence of a specific regulatory approach 
to ODR. According to Gibbons, the following options are available for the 
regulation of ODR:  
First, governments may affirmatively regulate ODR by accrediting ODR 
providers and establishing de jure standards for B2C ODR services. Second, 
governments may elect a laissez-fair approach and permit e-commerce to 
create institutions that support a market for dispute resolution services and 
32 Clark and Hoyle, above n 10, 5. 
33 See generally Michael L Rustad, Richard Buckingham, Diane D’ Angelo and Katherine 
Durlacher, ‘An Empirical Study of Predispute Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Social Media 
Terms of Service Agreements’ (Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 20 April 2012) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2043199>. 
34 NADRAC, The Development of Standards for ADR (2000) 
<http://www.nadrac.gov.au/publications/PublicationsByDate/Pages/DevelopmentofStandards.as
px>; NADRAC, Suggestions to Help You when Resolving Disputes 
<http://www.nadrac.gov.au/publications/DisputeResolutionGuide/Pages/SuggestionstoHelpYou
WhenResolvingDisputes/4-6ADRstandards.aspx>; Mediator Standards Boards, National 
Mediator Accreditation Standards <http://www.msb.org.au/mediator-standards/standards>.  
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permit that market to define the standards for consumer dispute resolution. 
Between these two extremes, there is a third option, the hybrid approach.35 
Schultz addresses three modalities: accreditation,36 clearinghouses37 and online 
appeals.38 Morek examines four modalities for the regulation of ODR,39 of 
which law and norms appear to bear similar characteristic to government 
regulation and self-regulation. The other two, namely the market and 
technology, can arguably be considered different models with respect to the 
above mentioned list. Importantly, by looking at the theoretical and practical 
foundation of international commercial arbitration, Patrikios argues:  
[T]he optimum solution is a truly international, decentralised, multi-
stakeholder, multi-level and multi-instrument co-regulatory system based on 
ODR and centred on transnational online arbitration with the role of the courts 
limited to the guardianship of public policy.40 
Patrikios further argues for the need for Lex informatica (‘the body of 
transnational substantive rules of e-business law and usages, as well as the 
method of their application for the resolution of e-disputes by arbitration’)41 as 
an appropriate approach ‘to the proliferation of online arbitration and the co-
regulation of cross-border e-business’.42  
35 Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, ‘Creating a Market for Justice; a Market Incentive Solution to 
Regulating the Playing Field: Judicial Deference, Judicial Review, Due Process, and Fair Play in 
Online Consumer Arbitration’ (2002) 23 Northwestern Journal of International Law & 
Business 1, 5–6.  
36 ‘Furthermore, it permits regulation: The regulatory framework of a trustmark is made up of the 
conditions for granting it, and these conditions can be easily connected to a set of substantive 
rules’: Schultz, above n 24, 96. 
37 Ibid 97–8: ‘A second modality of ODR regulation is control of access to ODR providers. I 
contend that this modality permits the regulation of ODR in different formats because it allows 
the control of different aspects of access to ODR providers … Such a clearinghouse would be 
able to regulate in three ways: (1) by controlling information about ODR providers, (2) by 
controlling filing, and (3) by reputation set against the rules of the clearinghouse.’  
38 Ibid 100: ‘The third modality of ODR provider regulation is control of the providers work on a 
case-by-case basis.’ 
39 Rafal Morek, ‘The Regulatory Framework for Online Dispute Resolution: A Critical View’ 
(2006) 38 University of Toledo Law Review 163. 
40 Antonis Patrikios, ‘The Role of Transnational Online Arbitration in Regulating Cross-Border E-
Business –– Part I’ (2008) 24(1) Computer Law & Security Review 1 
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0267364907001094>.  
41 Antonis Patrikios, ‘Resolution of Cross-Border E-Business Disputes by Arbitration Tribunals 
on the Basis of Transnational Substantive Rules of Law and E-Business Usages: The Emergence 
of the Lex Informatica’ (2006) 38 University of Toledo Law Review 271, 274. 
42 Ibid 272.  
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The next question is: what is the rationale behind these regulatory approaches? 
By referring to the OECD Guidelines with regards to online consumers, Calliess 
indicates that ‘[t]he guiding idea behind this call for self-regulation was that the 
advent of the Internet enables cross-border b2c-e-commerce’.43 The reason is 
that ‘multi-jurisdictional litigation involving very complicated questions of 
conflict of contract laws and applicable consumer protection regimes is not 
suitable for the relatively small values at stake’.44  
Kleinsteuber notes that ‘laws cannot regulate the Internet in many cases’ and 
‘the Internet as a global medium cannot be caged in by nation-states’.45 As such, 
this author advocates the need for new concepts. In the international arena, the 
paper ‘International Policy on Industry Self-regulation’ recognises the 
importance of self regulation of e-commerce ‘as the only useful option because 
online trades are increasingly crossing jurisdictional boundaries’.46 
However, Gibbons describes the drawbacks of the self-regulatory approach in 
the following manner: 
Alternatively, a laissez-faire market solution focusing solely on consumer 
action is even less likely to succeed, because the process is not transparent. 
Consumers do not have the time or the incentive to investigate ODR options 
until the post-contract dispute arises.47  
It also seems that affirmative legislations to regulate ODR may not be 
successful on their own due to the changing nature of the technology and 
business models.48 Therefore, it is evident that some writers favour the hybrid 
approach as the most suitable approach in this respect and make analyses of 
regulatory models with their pros and cons. For example, Gibbons seems to 
advocate a hybrid approach: ‘Regulatory models that provide voluntary safe 
harbour provisions, coupled with explicit incentives to encourage due process 
and fair play to ameliorate the repeat-player influence, may be the superior 
43 Gralf-Peter Calliess, ‘Online Dispute Resolution: Consumer Redress in a Global Market Place’ 
(2006) 7(8) German Law Journal 647, 654. 
44 Ibid 654–5.  
45 Hans J Kleinsteuber, ‘The Internet between Regulation and Governance’ (undated) 72 
<http://www.osce.org/fom/13844>.  
46 The Treasury, Taskforce on Industry Self-Regulation, International Policy on Industry Self-
Regulation, 
<http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/1123/HTML/docshell.asp?URL=appd.asp>.  
47 Gibbons, above n 35, 6.  
48 Ibid 6.  
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regulatory models.’49 The author gives two reasons: ‘these models are flexible 
and are more likely to keep pace with the evolution of e-commerce.’50 In a 
similar vein, Morek argues in favour of a co-regulatory model which entails ‘a 
combination of both private and national and international mechanisms, 
working in a coordinated effort to provide the optimal regulatory framework of 
online dispute resolution’.51 
This brief literature review indicates the still debated nature of the various 
regulatory approaches to the regulation of ODR. The next question of how 
effective the OECD Guidelines and the Australian Guidelines are in terms of 
providing an appropriate regulatory framework for ODR is worth examining in 
this regard. From the regulatory perspective of ODR (including OCA), it can be 
argued that these online consumer protection guidelines have several 
problematic elements, despite their importance as regulatory sources for the 
protection of online consumers and the provision of appropriate dispute 
resolution mechanisms. In view of these theoretical underpinnings of the 
regulatory models applicable to the regulation of ODR, the following sections 
explore some problematic aspects of the regulatory approaches advocated in 
both the OECD Guidelines and Australian Guidelines in the context of the 
resolution of B2C e-commerce disputes. 
V REGULATORY APPROACHES OF THE OECD AND 
AUSTRALIAN GUIDELINES  
Before moving to discussion of these problematic aspects of the regulatory 
approach adopted in the guidelines, it is important to identify the regulatory 
elements embedded in these guidelines. It seems that there are three regulatory 
approaches within the parameters of these guidelines.  
The first includes the promotion of self-regulatory approach. The OECD 
Guidelines can be considered a source which allows self-regulation as an 
appropriate regulatory model. Most importantly, the OECD considers self-
regulatory policy ‘a legitimate alternative to formal regulation … being 
embraced by member countries at different rates’.52 The OECD Guidelines have 
clear principles which promote the development of ‘fair, effective and 
transparent self-regulatory and other policies and procedures, including 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, to address consumer complaints’.  
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid.  
51 Morek, above n 3, 76.  
52 Taskforce on Industry Self-Regulation, above n 46. 
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In contrast, it should also be pointed out that the self-regulatory approach has 
not been expressly incorporated into any of the Australian Guidelines, including 
dispute resolution mechanisms. However, it can be argued that Australian 
Guidelines promote self-regulatory approach. For example, they require 
business to provide ‘accurate and easily accessible information’ about ‘the 
relevant codes of practice of any relevant self-regulatory scheme’ to consumers. 
Their set of principles applicable to B2C e-commerce is one development that 
reflects commitment towards the regulation of online cross-border activities.53 
Moreover, its formation seems to be influenced by both the OECD Guidelines54 
and Australia’s policy approach to the regulation of e-commerce.55 
The second regulatory approach deals with applicable laws and jurisdictions, 
and national consumer protection laws. In order to protect online consumers, 
these oblige member countries to ensure online consumer protection ‘through 
their judicial, regulatory, and law enforcement authorities co-operate at the 
international level’.56  
The third approach seems to be a co-operative regulatory approach. It appears 
that the promotion of the self-regulatory approach, backed by a supportive 
legislative framework for the regulation of online consumer activities, including 
appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms which can be used for the resolution 
of B2C e-commerce disputes, could be valuable. For example, the OECD 
Guidelines also advocate the development of co-operative self-regulatory 
programs:  
ii)  Businesses and consumer representatives should continue to establish co-
operative self-regulatory programs to address consumer complaints and to 
assist consumers in resolving disputes arising from business-to-consumer 
electronic commerce.57 
53 See also Elisabeth Wentworth, ‘Online Dispute Resolution: Global Issues and Australian 
Standards’ (2002) 21(2) The Arbitrator & Mediator 21.  
54 Consumer and Business Affairs, Victorian Department of Justice, The Best Practice Model 
Translates the OECD Guidelines for the Australian Context, Web Seals of Approval Discussion 
Paper (January 2002) <http://www.consumer.vic.gov.au/library/publications/resources-and-
education/research/web-seals-of-approval-2002.pdf>. 
55 Australian Government, International Instruments (2011) 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/ECommerce/Pages/Internationalinstruments.aspx>. 
56 OECD Guidelines, above n 8, pt 4. 
57 Ibid pt 2 VI(B)(ii).  
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However, it can be argued that the drawbacks associated with the self-
regulatory, statutory approaches and co-operative regulatory approach could 
undermine the objective of promoting the self-regulatory approach backed by a 
supportive legislative framework, and so could diminish the viability of 
guidelines as a source of regulatory models for the regulation of ODR in the 
broader debate over the appropriate regulatory models for regulation.  
A Viability of the Self-Regulatory Approach 
Arguably, the self-regulatory approach embedded in the current online 
consumer protection guidelines does not provide an appropriate regulatory 
foundation for the development of ODR. The viability of this approach can be 
questioned from several perspectives. The first question relates to the lack of 
definition of self-regulation,58 which impedes understanding of the scope of the 
self-regulatory framework. Neither the OECD Guidelines nor the Australian 
Guidelines provide a set of specific principles which could be useful when the 
private sector designs its own self-regulatory mechanisms. At least, drafters of 
these guidelines could have clarified the consequences of applying self-
regulations for the resolution of B2C e-commerce disputes.  
The second question is whether either set of guidelines have binding force. 
Unfortunately, they do not,59 which could render their objectives futile. Does 
this mean that the OECD Guidelines and the Australian Guidelines have no 
influence over the sectors that come under these instruments? Vilalta’s view is 
that ‘[t]he fact that it is not a binding instrument does not constitute a real 
obstacle, but a value for the states that are competent in their internal strategies 
at a domestic level’.60 This could be because governments are likely to develop 
appropriate laws in line with these guidelines as ‘there is a strong moral 
obligation for the Member countries to utilise and implement these policy 
recommendations, which they themselves have jointly drafted’.61  
58 See Monroe E Price and Stefaan G Verhulst, Self-Regulation and the Internet (Kluwer Law 
International, 2005) 3 where they indicate that ‘[t]here is no single definition of self-regulation 
that is entirely satisfactory, and indeed, there should not be’. Furthermore, these two writers note 
that ‘[s]elf-regulation … consists of a series of representations, negotiations, contractual 
arrangements, and collaborative efforts with government. Self-regulation on the Internet is a 
subtle and changing combination of all of these activities’ and ‘self-regulation can be seen as the 
range of activity by private actors undertaken to prevent more intrusive and more costly action 
by government itself. In that sense, self-regulation can be explained as a collective economic 
decision-an intersection of maximization of profit and expressions of public interest’: at 5. 
59 OECD, Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce Frequently 
Asked Questions (FAQ) <http://www.oecd.org/sti/consumerpolicy/2091663.pdf>.  
60 Vilalta, above n 5, 106. 
61 FAQ, above n 59.  
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Moreover, private online businesses and consumers could design their dispute 
resolution mechanisms to reflect these guidelines so that online consumers 
would then have some form of regulatory backing for their online activities with 
online businesses. However, according to some scholars, the self-regulatory 
approach of the guidelines is not effective due to its lack of binding force.62  
The lack of binding force of these guidelines could lead to compliance 
problems. NADRAC notes that ‘[s]ome ADR service providers, whether 
individuals or organisations, may choose to ignore accepted standards of ADR 
practice’.63 This potential for negative behaviour raises the question as to 
whether the self-regulatory approach can in fact have a positive influence on the 
private sector, if it can ignore the standards of ODR.  
The other drawback relates to the nature of the compliance mechanisms 
enshrined in the guidelines.64 In responding to the issue of non-compliance, 
Segal indicates that ‘it must have effective compliance monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms, be underpinned by efficient dispute resolution 
processes’.65 Eijlander confirms this view within his definition of self-
regulation, by maintaining that ‘[s]elf-regulation in its pure form can be defined 
as regulation by organisations or associations in a field of society; not only do 
they create the rules, but they also monitor compliance with these rules and 
enforce them against their own members’.66  
It seems clear that there are principles in both the OECD Guidelines and the 
Australian Guidelines that support the development of an institution to monitor 
compliance with the guidelines as well as self-regulatory measures. The OECD 
Guidelines encourage member countries ‘to review and, if necessary, promote 
62 Smith, above n 11, 188; Marita Shelly and Professor Margaret Jackson, ‘Doing Business with 
Consumers Online: Privacy, Security and the Law’ (2008) 17(2) International Journal of Law 
and Information Technology 180, 186. 
63 NADRAC, A Framework for ADR Standards –– Report to the Commonwealth Attorney- 
General (2001) 75 
<http://www.nadrac.gov.au/publications/PublicationsByDate/Documents/BodyofReport.pdf>.  
64 Morek, above n 3, 38 notes that ‘there would be no enforcing or supervisory body to ensure that 
an ODR provider really complies with these principles in practice’.  
65 Jillian Segal, Institutional Self-Regulation: What should be the Role of the Regulator? (2001) 7 
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/NIGConf_081101.pdf/$file/NIGCon
f_081101.pdf>.  
66 Philip Eijlander, ‘Possibilities and Constraints in the Use of Self-Regulation and Co-Regulation 
in Legislative Policy: Experiences in the Netherlands –– Lessons to Be Learned for the EU?’ 
(2005) 9 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 1, 2 <http://www.ejcl.org/91/issue91.html>.  
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self-regulatory principles to encourage development of effective self-regulatory 
mechanisms that contain specific, substantive rules for dispute resolution and 
compliance mechanisms’.67 The problem is that there is no formally recognised 
institution or any formal enforcement mechanism within these guidelines.68  
This lack of any specific enforcement mechanism raises the question of whether 
having a central authority that can operate nationally and internationally is 
important, or whether nationally available government-sponsored consumer 
protection enforcement mechanisms can be utilised to fill this vacuum. Some 
developments can be seen within the OECD framework, in national and 
international contexts, which could be considered promising developments in 
terms of improving the compliance mechanism for the principles embedded in 
these guidelines and national consumer protection laws. Three examples can be 
cited in this regard. 
First, it must be noted that there is an existing compliance mechanism in the 
online consumer protection guidelines. The OECD hopes to achieve compliance 
through a peer review process.69 The OECD notes that ‘[t]hese “soft” laws are 
nonetheless effective thanks to the OECD’s highly developed process of peer 
review’.70 However, it seems that such a peer review process has not been 
commenced in the area of ODR for the resolution of B2C e-commerce cross-
border disputes.  
Secondly, there are some further developments that could be utilised to enhance 
the compliance with the guidelines in general and self-regulation measures in 
particular. For example, in the Australian national context, a recent development 
is the Mediator Standards Board (MSB), which could play a pivotal role in this 
respect. The MSB (launched in 2010)71 as a main body reflects the sector-
specific practical approach to the development of ADR in Australia because it is 
67 Taskforce on Industry Self-Regulation, above n 46; see also OECD Guidelines, above n 8.  
68 See also Smith, above n 11, 168; Shelly and Jackson, above n 62.  
69 OECD, Peer Review Process: A Tool for Co-operation and Change 
<http://www.oecd.org/site/0,3407,en_21571361_37949547_1_1_1_1_1,00.html>. 
70 OECD, Information Disclosure 
<http://www.oecd.org/document/26/0,3746,en_2649_34495_33945946_1_1_1_1,00.html>: 
‘The OECD, through its committees, facilitates the production of internationally agreed 
instruments, decisions and recommendations. Decisions and treaties negotiated within the 
OECD are legally binding whereas recommendations are not legally binding and are considered 
as “soft” law.’  
71 MSB, About Us, <http://www.msb.org.au/about-us>. ‘The launching of the MSB today reflects 
positively on the willingness of the mediation profession in Australia to achieve self regulation 
and to collaborate to establish a body of standards, notwithstanding the diversity of the field and 
its respective differences’: Murray Kellam AO, Speech delivered at the 10th National Mediation 
Conference Adelaide, 7 September 2010, 1.  
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responsible for the development of mediator standards and the implementation 
of the National Mediator Accreditation System (NMAS).72 This is a promising 
development for the evolution of standards applicable to online mediation; 
however, it is still questionable whether this body has a mandate to cover the 
other ADR mechanisms, such as online conciliation and online arbitration.  
Thirdly, in the international context, there are existing institutional mechanisms 
which could be used for this purpose. The International Consumer Protection 
and Enforcement Network (ICPEN)73 to which the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC) belongs, could be considered promising thanks 
to its cross-border enforcement element, which suits the B2C e-commerce 
cross-border environment. This mechanism could be developed to monitor the 
enforcement of the guidelines, but also as an effective dispute resolution 
mechanism in the cross-border B2C e-commerce context. It can be further 
argued that this international initiative, combined with national enforcement 
bodies, resembles the co-ordinated approach advocated by the OECD 
Guidelines and the Australian Guidelines and would enable a higher 
commitment to compliance with self-regulatory measures by ODR service 
providers.  
B Conflict of Law Rules and Consumer Protection Laws 
1 Applicable Law and Jurisdiction under the OECD 
Guidelines 
Both the OECD and Australian Guidelines contain principles with regards to 
conflict of law rules. Conflict of law rules, also called ‘private international law 
rules’, are utilised to resolve ‘conflicts between legal systems’.74 This may 
include one country where different laws are applied in different states, such as 
in Australia. As Svantesson notes, ‘each state makes its own private 
72 Ibid: ‘The creation of one central entity responsible for mediator standards and accreditation is 
a landmark development in the history of mediation in Australia.’ 
73 International Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network, Protecting Consumers 
Worldwide <https://icpen.org/>. 
74 M Davies, A S Bell and P L G Brereton, Nygh’s Conflict of Laws in Australia (LexisNexis, 
8th ed, 2010) 7. See Reid Mortensen, Richard Garnett and Mary Keyes, Private International 
Law in Australia (LexisNexis, 2nd ed, 2011) 4: ‘In Australia, other common law countries and 
civil law countries, private international law is concerned with these three issues: jurisdiction, 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, and choice of law.’  
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international law rules (ie the private international law rules are part of the 
domestic law of each state)’.75 
Some of the OECD Guidelines allow conflict of law rules which are nationally 
and internationally applicable to be applied to B2C cross-border e-commerce 
transactions, eg:  
Business-to-consumer cross-border transactions, whether carried out 
electronically or otherwise, are subject to the existing framework on 
applicable law and jurisdiction.76 
There are, however, several drawbacks embedded in the Guidelines. For 
example, the phrase ‘the existing framework on applicable law and jurisdiction’ 
refers to the established conflict of law rules which exist nationally and 
internationally. This guideline is broadly designed to apply the existing 
applicable law and jurisdiction-related legal framework to B2C cross-border 
transactions which take place either electronically or otherwise. This approach 
seems to be fruitless and shows no sign of making any initial attempt to 
demarcate basic principles in relation to applicable law and jurisdiction with a 
focus on the B2C cross-border e-commerce disputes and ODR mechanisms.  
Instead of adopting such a targeted approach, the OECD encourages 
‘governments, businesses, consumers and their representatives to participate in 
and consider the recommendations of ongoing examinations of rules regarding 
applicable law and jurisdiction’. OECD Guideline VI(A) notes that 
consideration must be given to modifying the existing legal framework in 
regards to applicable law and jurisdiction in order ‘to ensure effective and 
transparent consumer protection in the context of the continued growth of 
electronic commerce’. Referring to modification of the existing legal framework 
relevant to applicable law and jurisdiction, VI(A) stipulates that ‘governments 
should seek to ensure that the framework provides fairness to consumers and 
businesses [and] facilitates electronic commerce’.  
The next question is whether the OECD and its member countries have taken 
effective measures to overcome issues associated with conflict of law rules 
applicable to the B2C cross-border setting. In other words, can these obligations 
be fulfilled by OECD member governments in the situation of cross-border B2C 
e-commerce at present? The answer seems to be no. 
75 Dan Svantesson, ‘An Introduction to Jurisdictional Issues in Cyberspace’ (2004) 15 Journal of 
Law, Information and Science 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/JlLawInfoSci/2004/3.html>. 
76 OECD Guidelines, above n 8, Guideline VI(A). 
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As far as the OECD is concerned, the OECD itself acknowledges that ‘rules 
regarding applicable law and jurisdiction in the consumer context could have 
implications for a broad range of issues in electronic commerce, just as rules 
regarding applicable law and jurisdiction in other contexts could have 
implications for consumer protection’.77 Moreover, it is mentioned in the OECD 
Guidelines’ Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) that ‘[t]he language on 
jurisdiction and applicable law within the Guidelines reflects the complexity 
and the current lack of international consensus on these issues’.78 It has been 
stated in the OECD Conference on Empowering E-consumers Strengthening 
Consumer Protection in the Internet Economy Background Report that ‘[o]ver 
the past decade, the 1999 Guidelines have been widely promoted and adopted 
by stakeholders through (i) new or adapted regulatory frameworks, (ii) private 
sector initiatives, and (iii) consumer education initiatives’.79 Even though these 
developments have some merit in relation to online consumer protection, there 
is no committed approach to at least put forward a basic set of principles in 
relation to conflict of law rules on the resolution B2C electronic commerce 
disputes.  
The lack of a harmonised approach to jurisdiction and applicable law is also 
reflected in the responses given to the survey conducted by the OECD.80 
Unfortunately, the situation seems to exist without necessary changes being 
brought by the OECD, as indicated in the statement made during the OECD 
conference in 2010 that ‘the various approaches to choice of law and rules on 
jurisdiction complicate the matter. Consumer rights and obligations may vary 
considerably from one jurisdiction to another’.81 As such, it can be argued that 
the OECD has not produced an internationally developed, harmonised legal 
77 Ibid.  
78 FAQ, above n 59.  
79 OECD, Conference on Empowering E-consumers: Strengthening Consumer Protection in the 
Internet Economy, Background Report (December 2009) 14 
<http://www.oecd.org/document/50/0,3746,en_21571361_43348316_43385778_1_1_1_1,00.ht
ml>: ‘In most OECD countries, regulations on information disclosure requirements for business 
pre-date the 1999 Guidelines. To adapt these rules to the online environment, further e-
commerce specific instruments including laws, regulations, and guidance, have been adopted 
over the years, or are being developed by countries. These instruments address a range of related 
issues including fraud, spam, privacy, security, enforcement, and dispute resolution and redress.’  
80 Ibid 17.  
81 OECD, Conference on Empowering E-Consumers: Strengthening Consumer Protection In The 
Internet Economy, Summary of Key Points and Conclusions, Directorate for Science, 
Technology and Industry Committee on Consumer Policy (2010) 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/10/45061590.pdf>. 
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framework in terms of jurisdiction and applicable law relating to B2C cross-
border e-commerce transactions.  
A similar situation is reflected in the enforcement of foreign judgments that can 
be delivered in B2C e-commerce disputes. In relation to the enforcement of 
judgments delivered by government-sponsored courts, the OECD Guidelines 
states that countries should ‘co-operate and work toward developing agreements 
or other arrangements for the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments 
resulting from disputes between consumers and businesses’.82 On the face of 
this, it seems that this guideline recognises the need for appropriate 
arrangements for the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments 
resulting from B2C disputes. From the government perspectives, the failure of 
current attempts by governments to revise or make a set of internationally 
applicable modern conflict of law rules, even in the offline context, indicates the 
difficulty of bringing modifications to the existing legal framework.83  
International efforts are also failing to address the conflict of law rules 
applicable to consumer contractual settings. For example, the Hague Convention 
on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 has excluded consumer disputes84 even 
though it is the counterpart for litigation of the New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.85 The reasons for the 
exclusion of consumers are related to ‘the existence of more specific 
international instruments, and national, regional or international rules that claim 
exclusive jurisdiction for some of these matters’.86 As such, a harmonised 
approach is advocated to overcome these conflicting and country- or region-
specific regulatory measures taken by governments.87 The Australian 
perspective is noted by Garnett in the following terms: 
82 OECD Guidelines, above n 8, pt 4. 
83 See also Megan Richardson and Richard Garnett, ‘Towards and beyond an Australian Private 
International Law of Cross-Border Communications Disputes’ (2006) 11(4) Media and Arts Law 
Review 331.  
84 Marta Pertegás, ‘The Brussels I Regulation and the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements’ (2010) 11(1) ERA-Forum 19, 20. 
85 J J Spigelman AC, ‘The Hague Choice of Court Convention and International Commercial 
Litigation’ (Paper presented at the conference on Commonwealth Law Conference, Hong Kong, 
7 April 2009) 1 
<http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/vwFiles/spigelman070409.pd
f/$file/spigelman070409.pdf>. 
86 The Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, Outline of the 
Convention (February 2012) 2 <http://www.hcch.net/upload/outline37e.pdf>. 
87 See, eg, Moira Patterson, E-commerce Law (2001) 
<http://www.apec.org.au/docs/paterson.pdf>: ‘In an Internet environment, this means that any 
rights or penalties must be enforceable on a global basis. This in turn requires harmonisation of 
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What is required to achieve this outcome is that governments and courts of 
nation states put aside their parochial, domestic interests in favour of the goal 
of multilateral harmonisation. It will be only then that the Convention may 
truly come to be seen as the counterpart to the New York Convention on 
arbitral agreements and awards.88 
When it comes to electronic commerce, it is natural that further complexities 
and challenges will emerge in the modification of existing rules of applicable 
law and jurisdiction.  
The current enforcement of foreign judgments is based on the laws individually 
developed or on regionally developed mechanisms; for example, the Foreign 
Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) can be cited for the first and the European Council 
Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 2000 for the 
second.89 This regulation has also excluded its application to ‘arbitration’.90 In 
fact, it must be noted that some measures are being discussed towards 
developing harmonised legal approaches in the form of Model Laws for 
jurisdiction and applicable law for consumer contracts from regional 
perspectives.91  
legal frameworks to better enable dispute resolution and redress in respect of breaches of the 
rights of intellectual property owners, consumers and other e-commerce participants.’ 
88 Richard Garnett, ‘The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Magnum Opus or Much Ado about 
Nothing?’ (2009) 5 Journal of Private International Law 161, 180. 
89 Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of the European Council of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction 
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [2000] OJ 
L 12/1, European Judicial Network, in civil and commercial matters, Enforcement of Judgments 
– Community Law (November 2009) (‘Regulation (EC) No 44/2001’) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/enforce_judgement/enforce_judgement_ec_en.htm>; Henrik 
Ringbom, ‘EU Regulation 44/2001 and its Implications for the International Maritime Liability 
Convention’ (2004) 35 Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce 1, 3.  
90 Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, above n 89, art 1(2)(d).  
91 Diego Fernandez Arroyo, ‘Current Approaches towards Harmonization of Consumer Private 
International Law’ (April 2009) 58(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 411, 411, 
417 <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayIssue?iid=5469284>. The proposals made by 
the governments such as Brazil, Canada and the United States are listed respectively: ‘Buenos 
Aires Proposal’, ‘the Draft Model Law on Jurisdiction and Applicable Law on Consumer 
Contracts’ and ‘the US government presented a revised version of its proposal, which consists in 
Legislative Guidelines for an Inter-American Law on the Availability of Mechanisms for 
Consumer Dispute Resolution and Redress for Consumers, along with four model laws.’ 
Permanent Council of the Organization of American States Committee on Juridical and Political 
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Thus it is evident that the drafters of the OECD Guidelines have paid 
insufficient attention to producing a specific set of principles relevant to 
applicable law and jurisdiction which can be applied to B2C cross-border 
e-commerce disputes. Unfortunately, the drafters have left problems associated 
with applicable law and jurisdiction to be determined by traditional legal 
principles, which are largely irrelevant to B2C e-commerce disputes.  
2 Applicable Law and Jurisdiction under the Australian 
Guidelines  
As far as Australian conflict of law rules applicable to cross-border e-commerce 
are concerned, the most salient observation is that there is no specific legal 
framework in relation to the jurisdiction of internet disputes, as Garnett makes 
clear that ‘[t]here are currently no specific provisions on jurisdiction and 
applicable law in relation to electronic commerce disputes under Australian 
law’.92  
Unfortunately, it can be argued that the Australian guidelines do not provide 
specific guidance in terms of jurisdiction and applicable law tailored to B2C 
e-commerce disputes. This argument can be supported by examining two 
important guidelines referring to applicable law and jurisdiction. It appears that 
Guideline 48 deals with applicable law and jurisdiction to the B2C cross-border 
e-commerce disputes, and Guideline 49 governs applicable law and jurisdiction 
within Australia. Both of these principles need to be discussed. For clarity, each 
warrants a separate focus, as 48 applies to the international context and 49 
applies only to the Australian national context. Guideline 48 stipulates: 
48.  Where a business specifies an applicable law or jurisdiction to govern any 
contractual disputes or a jurisdiction or forum where disputes must be 
determined, it should clearly and conspicuously state that information at the 
earliest possible stage of the consumer’s interaction with the business. 
As far as the scope of Guideline 48 is concerned, businesses should specify 
information clearly and conspicuously in regards to the ‘applicable law or 
jurisdiction’ and dispute resolution mechanism at the earliest stage of 
interaction with the consumer. Under this principle, a business can choose the 
applicable law and specify which forum has the jurisdiction to determine 
disputes in case of a dispute which may emerge out of a B2C e-commerce 
contract.  
Affairs, Report of the Coordinator of the Informal Working Group (May 2010) 
<http://www.oas.org/dil/CP-CAJP_2874-10_eng.pdf>. 
92 Richard Garnett, Report to the European Commission: ‘Section 1: The Applicability of Private 
International Law to Online Transactions’ 2: ‘It is therefore necessary to examine the general 
law principles of jurisdiction based on both “common law” and statutory principles.’  
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It can be argued that this Guideline does not provide specific and clear 
information about the obligation of businesspeople to specify ‘an applicable law 
or jurisdiction’. The wording appears to be unclear, reflected by the wording, 
‘information at the earliest possible stage of the consumer’s interaction with the 
business’. The concern is that it is left open at what stage of the interaction 
between businesses and consumers businesses should specify ‘an applicable law 
or jurisdiction’. Is it sufficient to state such information on the website with 
which the consumer interacts, or before the formation of contractual obligations, 
or at the point where the business enters into an agreement with the consumer?  
It can also be argued that this principle enables businesspeople to determine 
both applicable law and forum for the resolution of disputes which may arise 
out of contractual arrangements between online businesspeople and online 
consumers. Online businesspeople thus have two options: the first is to apply 
self-regulatory rules as applicable laws to such disputes and ODR mechanisms 
as appropriate forums, both of which are designed by online businesspeople. 
The second option is the selection of the national court of a particular country as 
the forum and the laws of the same forum country or another country as 
applicable laws.  
As far as the first option is concerned, this principle adopts a flexible approach 
to the issue of the choice of applicable law and jurisdiction in the resolution of 
contractual disputes, given the cross-border dimension of B2C e-commerce 
disputes. Accordingly, it can be argued that such an approach is in compliance 
with the rationale behind the emergence of ODR. In this it is recognised that 
ODR mechanisms emerged as an appropriate solution to overcome the 
drawbacks associated with legal frameworks and with these traditional dispute 
resolution mechanisms. For example, Muñoz-López notes one important aspect 
of the rationale behind the development of ADR and ODR in the following 
terms: ‘ADR offline can be successfully used to evade the conflict of laws 
complicated process. The jurisdiction problem is immediately solved.’93 This 
scholar further notes that ‘ODR goes beyond as it not only solve the problem of 
93 José Edgardo Muñoz-López, ‘Internet Conflict of Laws: A Space of Opportunities for ODR’ 
(2009) 14 International Law, Revista Colombiana de Derecho Internacional 163, 182. 
<http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=+Internet+Conflict+of+Laws%3A+A+Space+of+Opportu
nities+for+ODR%2C+&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5>. 
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the conflict of laws process but also is successful in reducing legal costs and 
time consumption for business disputants’.94 
Importantly, in the context of cross border B2C e-commerce disputes, the 
selected applicable law and forum will not provide a positive solution because 
of the problematic nature of the variation in national laws and courts in any 
particular country. Any applicable law or jurisdiction clauses which include 
those of another country could be problematic unless they comply with the 
Australian CCA.95 For example, if these clauses are embedded in standard form 
contracts between online businesspeople and Australian online consumers, 
which are known as ‘take it or leave it’ contracts, such clauses may be unfair 
and as a result they may become void if they do not comply with the fairness 
test of the CCA.  
In cases where such clauses are designed unilaterally by businesspeople, leaving 
no opportunity for consumers to be involved in the formation of such 
contracts,96 they could be declared void by the Australian judiciary.97 A similar 
result could be produced in a case where a mandatory OCA clause is 
incorporated in a B2C cross-border e-commerce standard form contract because 
such a clause would deny the consumer access to a government-sponsored 
court.98 As a result, it can be argued that the intended purpose of this guideline 
can be diminished. 
At the same time, given the absence of court decisions that deal with ODR and 
access to courts, some insights into the problem can be drawn from the 
decisions delivered by the Australian courts in internet disputes: ‘[S]pecial 
features of the Internet present peculiar difficulties for the legal regulation of its 
content and, specifically, for the exclusion of access in defined jurisdictions.’99 
In the absence of a clear legal approach to dealing with how to establish 
jurisdiction and applicable law in the case of B2C cross-border e-commerce 
disputes, Australia faces the challenge of either updating existing laws or 
introducing a new set of laws which address the issues associated with 
applicable law and jurisdiction over internet disputes. Such progressive moves 
94 Ibid; see also Henry H Perritt Jr, ‘Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for New Forms 
of ADR’ (2000) 15 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution Journal 675.  
95 CCA, vol 3, sch 2, pt 2-3. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Australian Consumer Law, A Guide to the Unfair Contract Terms Law (2010) 7 
<http://www.consumerlaw.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=the_acl/guidance.htm>. 
98 CCA, s 25(k): ‘a term that limits, or has the effect of limiting, one party’s right to sue another 
party.’ 
99 Dow Jones and Company Inc v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56 [87]. 
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need to be in line with developments taking place in other countries and to have 
some flexibility in their structure in order to adjust with evolving technology.100 
Such an online jurisdiction-specific legal approach would enable the national 
courts to become an appropriate final redress mechanism for the online 
consumer. Importantly, Australia could develop specific model laws addressing 
issues associated with jurisdiction, applicable law and the enforcement of 
foreign judgments tailored to the B2C e-commerce setting in line with the 
developments taking place in the EU, the United States, Canada and Brazil. 
Guideline 49 stipulates: 
49.  A business located in Australia that enters into a contract with a consumer 
whom the business believes is resident in Australia — for instance, because of 
the consumer’s address — should spell out which Australian jurisdiction’s law 
is the governing law of that contract. It should also make clear that any 
contractual disputes will be heard by Australian courts and tribunals. 
This Guideline is designed to address both the governing laws of B2C e-
commerce contracts and jurisdiction within Australia. Three features can be 
identified: (1) the governing law of the contract must be an Australian 
jurisdiction’s law, which avoids the use of foreign law as the governing law of 
such contracts; (2) the appropriate forum for the resolution of any dispute 
arising out of such a contract is Australian courts and tribunals; and (3) this is an 
attempt to reduce the use of conflict of law rules. These elements can be 
considered positive developments from the online consumer protection 
perspective.  
However, there are some drawbacks in regards to the Guideline, which states 
that ‘it should also make clear that any contractual disputes will be heard by 
Australian courts and tribunals’. Does this mean that the Australian Guidelines 
recognise both adjudicatory (binding arbitration) and non-adjudicatory ADR 
mechanisms (facilitative ADR mechanisms) or none of these mechanisms? The 
answer favours the latter. All B2C online disputes which emerge between online 
businesses located in Australia and online consumers who are residents of 
Australia have to go to a national court for redress. This principle is arguably a 
rejection of mandatory online consumer arbitration, whether pre- or post-
100 See also Patterson, above n 87: ‘Law by its nature tends to evolve slowly but the exponential 
growth in the use of Internet requires rapid and well coordinated responses. This difficulty is 
magnified by uncertainty concerning the nature and implications of future technological 
developments’.  
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mandatory arbitration mechanisms. The other question is: can a consumer who 
has a small-dollar dispute seek remedy through a national court or undefined 
tribunal in Australia, where the cost of receiving redress can be higher than the 
actual cost suffered by the consumer?  
Moreover, does this mean that a business located in Australia can go to a 
national court, public tribunal or private tribunal in case of a contractual 
dispute? What does ‘tribunals’ mean? This word is not defined in the definition 
section of the guidelines. This lack of definition in regards to ‘tribunals’ makes 
the application of this guideline unclear and so basically worthless from the 
perspective of online consumer protection.  
Ghoshray notes that ‘in practice, parties are not bound to submit to a particular 
jurisdiction and choice of law. They are free to choose their own jurisdictions 
and laws’.101 However, it is evident that this freedom is restricted due to the 
compelling element of the choice of applicable law and jurisdiction in the 
Australian Guidelines.  
The other question relates to whether consumers can oppose such a unilateral 
arrangement in cases where a business unilaterally determines an applicable law 
and a forum for the resolution of B2C e-commerce disputes. The Guideline’s 
approach seems to neglect the consumer’s right to refuse any arrangement of 
governing laws of contracts and forums for the resolution of any disputes 
arising out of their contract.  
Another problematic aspect is that neither the OECD Guidelines nor the 
Australian Guidelines address the situation where a business omits the 
specification of an applicable law or a forum in which to determine any dispute 
which arises from a B2C contract –– in other words, whether conflict of law 
rules can be applied or not.  
3 Consumer Protection Law 
It can also be argued that the OECD has not gone beyond national consumer 
protection laws. The OECD Guidelines make specific reference to the need to 
give priority to national consumer protection. Thus the OECD Guidelines 
drafters note that ‘nothing contained herein should restrict any party from 
exceeding these guidelines nor preclude Member countries from retaining or 
adopting more stringent provisions to protect consumers online’.  
101 Saby Ghoshray, ‘Charting the Future of Online Dispute Resolution: An Analysis of the 
Constitutional and Jurisdictional Quandary’ (2006) 38 University of Toledo Law Review 317, 
329.  
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In contrast, the Australian Guidelines highlight the reliance of online consumer 
protection on existing national consumer protection laws. This approach can be 
justified from the consumer protection perspective, but when this is considered 
from both consumer protection and online business perspectives in combination, 
there are some drawbacks which can undermine the strength of these guidelines.  
One such area is the current approach of the guidelines, which apply whatever 
position is taken by national consumer protection laws in regards to applicable 
law, jurisdiction and different types of online consumer arbitration scenarios. 
For example, it is evident that there is a lack of express provisions in both 
Australian national consumer protection laws and online consumer protection 
guidelines as to the validity of pre-dispute and post-dispute OCA clauses.102  
The other problematic aspect of these guidelines is the recognition of access to 
the courts, which can become a complex and inappropriate option for the B2C 
e-commerce scenario. The Australian Guidelines advocate access to the courts, 
with sections specifically ensuring compliance with access to the courts. For 
example, each of the internal and external dispute resolution mechanisms of the 
Australian Guidelines entails provisions such as:  
43. Businesses should set up internal procedures to handle consumer 
complaints: 
43.4 without prejudicing the rights of the consumer to seek legal redress.  
 47. This independent method of dispute resolution should be: 
47.7 without prejudice to judicial redress.103 
The appropriateness of national courts as a viable forum is questionable, due to 
their complex and time-consuming nature. Many writers have highlighted that 
national courts are not well equipped to resolve small-claims disputes and 
technology-related disputes. National courts are considered inappropriate for 
several reasons, with Schultz noting that:  
Courts are not likely to be the primary resolvers of most small- and medium-
sized disputes occurring in cyberspace — which are the majority of 
102 Instead, such clauses are addressed through a contractual legal approach, subjecting their 
validity to being tested against the test of fairness incorporated in the CCA.  
103 Australian Guidelines, above n 9. Reference No 5 appeared at the end of 43.4 –– ‘Australian 
Standard AS4269-1995 provides a guide to good practice in complaint-handling’ was omitted.  
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e-commerce disputes involving ODR providers — because courts are too slow 
and expensive. This is a general problem caused by the ubiquity of 
cyberspace, which clashes with the territoriality of jurisdiction and judicial 
authorities.104 
Moreover, Cortes notes that ‘[t]here is a clear consensus that our courts cannot 
provide a system that will effectively meet the needs of consumers in the new 
global marketplace, and that a global ODR network is the best solution to deal 
with consumer disputes’.105 In the recent OECD conference, it was also 
indicated that ‘in those cases where e-commerce transactions involve small 
amounts of money, consumers tend not to go to court when things go wrong’.106 
As a solution, it is further recognised that ‘effective, low-cost and adaptive 
online dispute resolution and redress mechanisms might help to address this’.107 
As such, it is questionable as to how far objectives of the guidelines such as ‘are 
designed to help ensure that consumers are no less protected when shopping 
online than they are when they buy from their local store or order from a 
catalogue’108 have been achieved nationally and internationally when it comes 
to conflict of law rules and the development of national consumer protection 
laws.  
C Attention to Developing a Co-operative Regulatory 
Approach 
Instead of creating specific benchmarks to address issues associated with ODR 
in general and OCA in particular, these guidelines promote a co-operative 
approach to be followed for dealing with B2C cross-border e-commerce-related 
issues. The Australian Guidelines are not based on co-operative principles like 
the OECD Guidelines of 1999,109 despite the fact that both instruments have 
104 Schultz, above n 24, 84. 
105 Cortes, above 24. See also Lilian Edwards and Caroline Wilson, ‘Redress and Alternative 
Dispute Resolution in EU Cross-Border E-Commerce Transactions’ (2007) 21 International 
Review of Law, Computers & Technology 315, 320: ‘Why do e-commerce customers not turn to 
the courts? Clearly, even conventional “high street” consumer disputes are rarely if ever 
litigated, due to (i) consumer ignorance and apathy as to legal remedies, (ii) the typically low 
cost of the items in dispute relative to (iii) the high cost of access to legal advice and judicial 
resolution.’ 
106 OECD Technology and Industry Committee on Consumer Policy, above n 81, 8. 
107 Ibid.  
108 OECD, Better Policies for Better Lives 
<http://www.oecd.org/internet/consumerpolicy/oecdguidelinesforconsumerprotectionintheconte
xtofelectroniccommerce1999.htm>. 
109 Even though the Australian Guidelines are based on the OECD 1999 Guidelines, they are 
limited in scope compared to the scope of the OECD Guidelines.  
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been designed for the B2C cross-border e-commerce setting. As such, the 
following section explores whether the OECD Guidelines promote a co-
operative approach that can be applied to strengthening the enforcement of 
OCA. It is argued that this instrument does not advocate a specific model for 
such a purpose and as a result the effectiveness of the guidelines is in doubt. 
The following guidelines are highlighted in this regard.  
In relation to the co-operative aspect of the dispute resolution guidelines, OECD 
Guideline VI(B) recognises the obligation of business, consumer representatives 
and government:  
VI(B) Businesses, consumer representatives and governments should work 
together to continue to use and develop fair, effective and transparent self-
regulatory and other policies and procedures, including alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms, to address consumer complaints and to resolve 
consumer disputes arising from business-to-consumer electronic commerce, 
with special attention to cross-border transactions. 
Accordingly, Guideline VIB(ii) addresses the co-operative approach between 
business and consumer representatives in terms of establishing ‘self-regulatory 
programs to address consumer complaints’. VIB(iii) entails the obligation of 
business, consumer representatives and government to provide effective ADR 
mechanisms for the resolution of business to consumer e-commerce disputes.  
In addition, both the OECD Guidelines and the Australian Guidelines promote 
fair, timely and cost-effective ADR mechanisms. For example, OECD 
Guideline VIB(i) requires both business and consumer representatives to 
establish ADR mechanisms which they should operate in compliance with the 
principles of fairness, timeliness, avoidance of undue cost and undue burden.  
Moreover, the OECD Guidelines provide that it is an obligation of the 
government to provide a ‘meaningful access to fair and timely alternative 
dispute resolution and redress without undue cost or burden’. The three groups 
of government, the business sector and consumer representatives are required to 
develop and use a fair, effective and transparent set of: (1) self-regulatory 
policies and procedures; and (2) ADR mechanisms to resolve B2C e-commerce 
disputes.  
Additionally, Guideline VIB states that ‘further study is required to meet the 
objectives of Section VI at an international level’ and VIB(iv) is also important 
in this regard as it refers to the innovative use of technology: 
 
 
280 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 17 NO 2 
 
In implementing the above, businesses, consumer representatives and 
governments should employ information technologies innovatively and use 
them to enhance consumer awareness and freedom of choice. 
As far as the co-operation principle is concerned in general, pt 4 of the OECD 
Guidelines obliges members to facilitate co-operation and ‘where appropriate 
the development and enforcement of joint initiatives at the international level’ 
among three major groups: businesses, consumer representatives and 
governments. Part 2 of the OECD Guidelines provides that ‘[g]overnments, 
businesses, consumers, and their representatives should work together to 
achieve such protection and determine what changes may be necessary to 
address the special circumstances of electronic commerce’. This includes the 
necessity of finding solutions to e-commerce issues through co-operation among 
these three stakeholders. If this guideline is interpreted broadly, resolution of e-
disputes should be conducted with the support of each of these stake holders.  
Indeed, it must therefore be noted that consumer protection is recognised 
through national as well as international co-operation, especially in the OECD 
Guidelines. For example, pt 4 describes the need for ‘building consensus, both 
at the national and international levels, on core consumer protections to further 
the goals of enhancing consumer confidence, ensuring predictability for 
businesses, and protecting consumers’. In addition, interestingly, such 
consensus needs to be based ‘on core consumer protections’. What does this 
mean? Given the absence of clarification of the scope of core consumer 
protection, it can be inferred that these can include basic consumer protection 
principles including effective redress mechanisms which are identified in the 
consumer protection literature. Hence, these guidelines require consumer rights 
to be protected at both national and international level.  
The OECD Guidelines do not provide a clear definition of the scope of the co-
operative principle. This has led to two questions. First, what is meant by co-
operation? And, secondly, what are the co-operative measures that can be 
adopted in order to protect consumer rights? In regard to the first question, at 
the outset it is already noted that both instruments encourage co-operative 
approach to achieve consumer protection. In a broader context, two inferences 
can be made. First, the drafters have intentionally left it to the government and 
the private sector to develop appropriate measures to protect online consumers 
without imposing any particular strategies that can undermine the growing 
online markets. Secondly, the purpose of the guidelines is merely to set a 
framework for the protection of consumers, which does not necessitate 
definitional provisions.  
From a theoretical perspective, accordingly, the government’s co-operation has 
become imperative because there is a need for leadership and decision-making 
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in response to problems such as: the inappropriateness of the application of 
offline legal frameworks; the lack of international consensus on producing 
international treaties; and the changing and complex nature of the technology 
involved in e-commerce activities. Most importantly, if the power imbalance is 
not adequately addressed and appropriate measures put in place, the progress of 
the online e-commerce market will be negatively affected and the rights of 
online consumers will continue to be adversely affected. As such, it should be 
noted that the government is obliged to develop appropriate methods to regulate 
the e-commerce environment in a committed and co-operative fashion.  
It is also important to note that the underlying rationale behind the principle of 
co-operation enshrined in the OECD Guidelines seems to be based on several 
factors: the complex nature of technology; private sector involvement; the 
transnational dimension of B2C e-commerce disputes; and conflicting national 
consumer protection laws among countries.110 It is also evident that these 
guidelines do not explicitly provide a legal basis for the development of a co-
operative mechanism such as enforcement of OCA awards through e-courts, 
except for the general intention to guide government, the private sector and 
consumer groups to take appropriate measures for the protection of consumers 
through co-operation.  
VI CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The literature indicates the lack of any specific regulatory model. The more that 
ODR is used and exposed to technological advances, it is reasonable to predict 
that there will be more opinions about the appropriate models for its regulation. 
Of course, conflicting legal approaches and the complex and changing nature of 
technology will not make it easy for law-makers to produce a stable regulatory 
framework for ODR. Most importantly, Morek rightly observes that ‘it is still 
difficult to predict which trend in ODR regulation will prevail’.111 
It must be mentioned that the new wave of ODR-related regulatory approaches 
in the form of online consumer protection guidelines is a promising 
development for establishing a secure ODR landscape in its own right within 
the complex e-commerce market. However, the current regulatory approach 
advocated by the OECD Guidelines and the Australian Guidelines is arguably 
vague and full of uncertainties, mainly driven by the problematic aspects 
110 See also Patrikios, above n 40.  
111 Morek, above n 3, 70.  
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associated with the self-regulatory and statutory approaches and the recognition 
of access to national courts.  
These problematic aspects embedded in these instruments could undermine their 
objectives and also undermine online disputants’ confidence, as an ordinary 
consumer expects an existing regulatory approach to comply with principles 
such as consistency and predictability, and to possess an adequate regulatory 
approach for online consumer protection. Unfortunately, these guidelines still 
apply to the B2C e-commerce platform and they provide an insufficient 
benchmark for the development of a B2C e-commerce friendly and focused 
regulatory approach to the regulation of ODR, both internationally and 
nationally.  
It is also timely to revise these online consumer protection guidelines, rather 
than remaining confined to making recommendations and mere encouragement 
for those such as ‘consumer representatives,’ ‘governments’ and ‘businesses and 
consumers’ to adopt co-operative measures for the protection of online 
consumers in the complex B2C e-commerce market. As such, it can be argued 
that the existing self-regulatory approach advocated in the OECD Guidelines 
and the Australian Guidelines needs to be amended by paying specific attention 
to ODR in general and OCA in particular. 
